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Ecological risk assessment has not been conducted for the proposed environmental 
applications of synthetic biology. To develop a quantitative framework for risk assessment of 
synthetic biology, I selected Southeast Farallon Island as a case study for modeling the 
deployment of gene drive modified house mice to reduce impacts to threatened species. 
Southeast Farallon Island is part of the Farallon Islands National Wildlife Refuge. The island is 
populated by invasive house mice that impact indigenous species. Gene drive technology has 
been proposed as a method to suppress invasive rodent populations through CRISPR-mediated 
genome editing. I applied the Bayesian Network – Relative Risk Model to predict the outcomes 
of a gene drive mouse eradication on Southeast Farallon Island. The Bayesian Network – 
Relative Risk Model is able to probabilistically evaluate multiple causal pathways, incorporating 
the influence of multiple stressors on multiple endpoints. I used a modified version of the R-
based model MGDrivE to simulate population genetics and population dynamics of gene drive 
mouse eradication strategies. I conducted simulations for three unique gene drive mouse 
release schemes across two assumed gene drive homing rates and two levels of supplemental 
rodenticide use; for a total of twelve simulated scenarios. I compared the relative eradication 
probabilities of these scenarios within a Bayesian network. Sensitivity analyses were conducted 
to compare the relative influence of rodenticide use and homing rate on the probability of 
successful mouse eradication. I found that increasing the assumed homing rate of the gene 
drive had a higher influence on mouse eradication than the addition of supplemental 
rodenticide. For most scenarios, simulations showed successful mouse eradications as early as 
seven years after gene drive deployment, with high probabilities of eradication within ten years. 
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This work builds upon the framework for synthetic biology ecological risk assessment, as 
outlined by chapter six of Gene Drives on the Horizon (NASEM 2016). The Bayesian network 
files are available electronically or upon request. Download the free version of Netica to view the 
models without a license (https://norsys.com/netica.html).  
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Proposed environmental applications of synthetic biology bring with them a host of novel management 
and regulatory considerations. Chapter 6 of Gene Drives on the Horizon (NASEM 2016) and Landis et al. 
(2020a) describe frameworks for risk assessment of synthetic biology using the Bayesian Network – 
Relative Risk Model (BN-RRM), with gene drives as an example of a synthetic biology-derived stressor. 
Using the BN-RRM framework, I constructed a probabilistic risk assessment model for the theoretical 
introduction of gene drive modified (GDM) house mice (Mus musculus) to suppress the invasive mouse 
population on Southeast Farallon Island. 
1.1 Introduction to Synthetic Biology 
The National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (NASEM) define synthetic biology as the 
generation of novel traits or organisms via the implementation of chemical or computational processes 
that do not occur naturally. One branch of synthetic biology is genome editing, defined as the 
introduction of new alleles or genes into an organism (NASEM 2016). Clustered regularly interspaced 
short palindromic repeats (CRISPR) Cas (CRISPR-Associated) systems are a common tool in genome 
editing. For example, CRISPR-Cas9 systems can modify specific DNA sequences using a complementary 
guide-RNA (gRNA) complexed with a DNA-targeting endonuclease (Cas9) that creates a double strand 
break at the target site in an organism’s genome. The new sequence is then inserted and replicated 
throughout the genome, making the organism homozygous for the desired allele (Webber et al. 2015; 
Knott and Doudna 2018). The level of gene editing precision offered by CRISPR-Cas systems has the 
potential to alter the germ lines of populations. Genome editing at the population scale is the 
conceptual foundation behind gene drive technology (NASEM 2016). 
1.2 Gene Drives and their Environmental Applications 




transfer to offspring at proportions greater than a Mendelian expectation (i.e. above 50%) (NASEM 
2016). CRISPR-Cas9-based gene drives have been synthesized (Hammond et al. 2016) to “drive” 
engineered traits through target populations. Intended applications of gene drives fall into two broad 
categories: population replacement and population suppression. The goal of population replacement is 
to substitute a target gene with an engineered gene, avoiding a fitness reduction in the target 
organisms. The goal of population suppression is to substitute the target gene with a gene that causes 
reduced organismal fitness, leading to a steep reduction or elimination of the target population 
(Marshall and Akbari 2016). Gene drives have been proposed for controlling vector-borne diseases, 
suppressing invasive species, and inducing pesticide tolerance or sensitivity in agricultural settings 
(NASEM 2016).  
1.2.1 Controversies and Uncertainties Around Gene Drive Use 
Proposed gene drive applications have come under scrutiny, with researchers questioning the ability of 
these constructs to successfully suppress or replace populations, in addition to their potential for 
adverse environmental impacts. For example, Webber et al. (2015) notes the possibility of dispersal of 
GDM organisms into non-target populations, potentially leading to unintended extinctions and 
alterations to community dynamics. Roberts et al. (2017) suggests that hybridization of GDM organisms 
with similar species in a region could spread gene drives to non-target species, leading to unintended 
population suppression or replacement.  
The development of organismal resistance to the homing properties of gene drives has also been 
investigated. Champer et al. (2017) modified Drosophila melanogaster with two types of CRISPR-Cas9 
gene drives in a laboratory study, monitoring inheritance patterns and mechanisms. The work of 
Champer et al. revealed two types of mutated resistance that resulted in the inability of the CRISPR 




resulted in zero fitness reduction to organisms, essentially creating a new genotype with no fitness 
reduction. The second type of mutation, termed out-of-frame resistance, led to a high organismal fitness 
cost. 
To overcome potential gene drive resistance, studies have proposed using a multiplexing approach to 
create gene drive constructs that target multiple DNA sequences in a gene using multiple gRNA 
sequences. This approach is expected to minimize the probability of resistance development by 
increasing the number of mutations required to negate the homing capabilities of a gene drive (Marshall 
et al. 2017; Noble et al. 2017; Noble et al. 2019). However, multiplexing has not undergone laboratory 
testing. Additionally, numerical models used to predict the resulting population dynamics and 
population genetics of proposed multiplexed gene drives have been largely deterministic (Noble et al. 
2017; Noble et al. 2019), failing to provide probabilistic estimates of successful population suppression 
or replacement. Risk assessment is a well-suited tool for evaluating the influence of resistance 
development on the probabilities of achieving management goals using gene drive technology. 
1.3 The Need for Adaptive Management of Synthetic Biology 
Given the lack of empirical data concerning environmental applications of gene drives, adaptive 
management has been suggested as a strategy to investigate proposed applications of gene drives in the 
environment (NASEM 2016; Landis et al. 2020a). Adaptive management is an iterative approach to 
decision making that provides a specific set of goals for governance and regulation of ecological systems. 
Adaptive management involves altering management strategies with the acquisition of new knowledge. 
This “iterative” process occurs throughout the course of working towards a management goal and 
follows an explicit set of guidelines to orient thinking and evaluation around an evolving management 




inform future management actions (Holling 1978). Walters (1986) outlines three specific goals of 
adaptive management: 
1. Management concerns should be framed as explicit questions to be evaluated in regards to the 
system being studied.  
2. The ecological system should be clearly defined so that all relevant variables can be evaluated in 
terms of available information and the inherent assumptions and limitations of available data.  
3. The history of the study region and its variance through time should be accounted for in regards 
to modeling techniques and proposed management strategies (Walters 1986).  
Landis et al. (2017) suggests the BN-RRM as an empirical risk assessment model to inform adaptive 
management processes. Because there is very little empirical information on environmental applications 
of synthetic biology, I reiterate that an adaptive management approach in the form of the BN-RRM 
would be a powerful tool for informing management decisions around gene drive technology. 
1.4 Why Risk Assessment? 
Risk assessment is a causal and empirical process that is well-suited for calculating probabilistic 
estimates of synthetic biology-related impacts to ecological systems. Risk assessment is defined as the 
estimation of probabilities of impacts to one or more endpoints due to the effects of one or more 
stressors (NASEM 2016). Landis and Wiegers (2005) outline the Relative Risk Model (RRM) as a 
framework for ranking the relative impacts of multiple stressors on multiple endpoints, where an 
endpoint is defined as some entity of management or regulatory concern. The RRM involves 
constructing a conceptual framework of the risk region, formulating a causal diagram of all variables that 
lead to impacts within the region (Landis and Wiegers 2005; Colnar and Landis 2007). Creating these 
conceptual frameworks involves listing sources that release stressors that occur in habitats, potentially 




The RRM is currently applied within the BN-RRM where these sources-to-impacts conceptual 
frameworks are used to construct Bayesian Networks (BNs). BNs are quantitative models that relate 
variables through conditional probability (Woodberry et al. 2004; Marcot et al. 2006; Pollino et al. 2006). 
BNs can be used to calculate risk to endpoints in the form of probability distributions representing the 
severity of impacts (Johns et al. 2017). Because of the BN-RRM’s causal structure, it would be an ideal 
framework for a systems-based evaluation of structures and processes involved in modeling impacts of 
synthetic biology in the environment. Additionally, the probabilistic nature of risk assessment is well-
suited for accounting for the high mathematical uncertainty that arises from the limited body of 
empirical information concerning synthetic biology and gene drives. 
1.4.1 Bayesian Networks 
BNs are acyclic (i.e. no feedback loops), probabilistic models that relate a network of variables through 
conditional probability. Nodes are separated into two primary classifications: parent nodes and child 
nodes (Marcot et al. 2006). In the BN-RRM, arrows in a BN represent causal linkages between variables, 
with parent nodes influencing child nodes (Landis et al. 2020a; Landis et al. 2020b). Child nodes contain 
conditional probability tables (CPTs) that hold the probabilistic relationship between a child node and its 
parent nodes. Nodes within a BN contain multiple variable states and CPTs contain the probabilities of 
each child node’s variable states given all possible combinations of parent node states (Marcot et al. 
2006; McDonald et al. 2015). 
1.5 Model Selection Criteria 
Risk assessment using the BN-RRM requires the selection of numerical models to calculate the 
probabilistic relationship between variables in the BN framework. These models should conform to the 
criteria put forward by chapter 6 of Gene Drives on the Horizon (NASEM 2016) and Landis et al. (2020a). 




Figure 1. Conceptual model for the SEFI invasive M. musculus case study, constructed using the framework of the Relative Risk 
Model, with sources releasing stressors that persist in habitats, causing effects, and eventually impacts to management endpoints. 
(**) indicates variables that that were quantitatively incorporated into parameterizing the BN model in figure 3. 
 
 
• Models should quantitatively trace causal pathways outlined in the conceptual framework for 
the risk assessment scenario. These models should reflect the state-of-the-knowledge on causal 
interactions between variables. 
• Models should be able to calculate risk to endpoints, incorporating the concerns of 
management, stakeholders, and the public. 
• Models should be able to elucidate sources of uncertainty and weigh the relative influence of 
variables or parameters on risk. 
• Models should allow for comparison between multiple management strategies. Costs and 
benefits should be comparable in the context of multiple endpoints. 
Meeting these requirements is requisite for the use of risk assessment as a tool for informing research 
and adaptive management. 
1.6 Case Study: Southeast Farallon Island 
The South Farallon Islands are part of the Farallon Islands National Wildlife Refuge and are located about 
30 miles west of San Francisco. Southeast Farallon Island (SEFI) is the largest island, with an area of 
approximately 40 hectares (Figure 2). The South Farallones are home to a variety of seabirds, pinnipeds, 
crickets, and salamanders. Additionally, SEFI is populated by invasive house mice (M. musculus) which 
prey upon endemic species such as the camel cricket (Farallonophilus cavernicolus), the maritime 
goldfield (Lasthenia maritima), and the juveniles and eggs of the Farallon arboreal salamander (Aneides 
lugubris farallonensis) (USFWS 2019a).  
The invasive mice serve to attract the migratory burrowing owl (Athene cunicularia). Burrowing owls are 
thought to feed primarily on M. musculus until the SEFI mouse population reaches a low abundance in 
late fall. Once the mouse population reaches its low point, ashy storm petrels (Oceanodroma 
homochroa) become the primary food source for owls. Ashy storm petrels are an endangered species 




invasive house mice increases the number of overwintering owls on SEFI. This leads to more owl-petrel 
predation in winter and spring months (USFWS 2019a). 
 
 
Figure 2. Map of the South Farallon Islands. SEFI is populated with invasive M. musculus. A 
locator map is included to highlight SEFI’s location relative to San Francisco, CA. 
 
A 2019 Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) by the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) 
proposed deployment of the chemical rodenticide, brodifacoum, as the preferred management strategy 
for eradicating invasive mice on SEFI. Brodifacoum is an anticoagulant that functions through vitamin K 




hand baiting (USFWS 2019a). This eradication plan was originally scheduled to occur November 2019 
(USFWS 2019a), but has since been withdrawn by USFWS due to concerns voiced by the California 
Coastal Commission (Newberry 2019). 
Using SEFI as a case study, I employed the BN-RRM to evaluate the risk of mouse eradication given a 
number of scenarios, simulating three hypothetical population suppression gene drive approaches, with 
and without supplemental brodifacoum deployment.  
1.7 Sox9 CRISPR-Cas9 Gene Drive 
A CRISPR-Cas9 gene drive has been proposed to spread the Sox9 male development gene to mouse 
offspring at a proportion greater than 95%, causing XX offspring to develop as males, resulting in sterility 
(Prowse et al. 2017). This estimated homing rate estimate was based on laboratory testing of a CRISPR-
Cas9 gene drives for Anopheles gambiae (Hammond et al. 2016). At the time of this work, laboratory 
testing of CRISPR-Cas9 gene drives on mice has not been conducted. To incorporate dynamics of this 
gene drive into a SEFI mouse eradication, I used a simulation approach to predict outcomes of twelve 
unique GDM mouse deployment scenarios (Table 1). I used the R-based model MGDrivE (Sánchez et al. 
2020b) for the simulations. MGDrivE is able to simulate population genetics, population dynamics, patch 
dynamics, and user-specified gene drive parameters into a Monte Carlo simulation framework. MGDrivE 
was originally intended for simulation of mosquito populations (Sánchez et al. 2020a). I modified 
MGDrivE to simulate mouse populations, altering functions affecting mating behavior and changing 
density-dependent and density-independent mortality equations. I also added functions to incorporate 
stochastic toxicological effects into MGDrivE simulations. See sections 2.2.3 and 2.2.3.1 for more details 




1.8 Rodenticide Use 
Because the focus of this work was to probabilistically evaluate gene drives in pest management, 
rodenticide use, as specified in the SEFI EIS (USFWS 2019), was not considered in isolation when 
simulating mouse eradication scenarios. However, gene drive simulations were run with and without 
supplemental rodenticide use in conjunction with GDM mouse deployment. Brodifacoum is also toxic to 
birds (Eason and Spurr 1995a), with reported LD50 values as low as 0.5 mg/kg. Because the Farallon 
Islands are home to a variety of seabird species, IPM is necessary for considering potential pathways of 
non-target chemical impacts. However, while the BN includes variables representing non-target 
pesticide impacts (Figure 3), these variables are unparameterized. In other words, no numerical models 
have yet been implemented to calculate the probabilities of impacts to non-target species. The 
calculations focused solely on mice, calculating the influence of rodenticide on mouse abundance and 
eradication risk. 
1.9 Findings  
I used the modified version of MGDrivE to simulate three unique GDM M. musculus deployment 
schemes. Each release scheme was simulated across two hypothetical rates of resistance allele 
generation by the Sox9 CRISPR-Cas9 gene drive. Additionally, each gene drive scenario was simulated 
with and without the inclusion of rodenticide-induced mortality, for a total of twelve simulations each 
run for 250 Monte Carlo repetitions. 
Altering the assumed resistance allele generation rate of the gene drive had more influence on the 
probability of a successful SEFI mouse eradication than the addition of a rodenticide. Resistance rate 
also had a relatively high influence on the time to reach successful mouse eradication. For one of the 
gene drive release schemes, eradication was not achieved in any of the Monte Carlo iterations unless a 




mouse eradication in all tested scenarios, but to a lesser extent than increasing homing rate. These 
results elucidate the importance of empirically determining homing rates in proposed gene drive 
constructs. 
2. METHODS 
First, I framed the Farallon Islands case study within the BN-RRM, delineating specific endpoints based 
on management goals for SEFI. To accomplish this, I delineated the pest management strategies to be 
incorporated into the risk assessment, constructing a conceptual model of sources, stressors, habitats, 
and effects that could alter risk to endpoints (Figure 1). Next, I outlined the step-by-step methodology I 
used to create a BN-RRM framework for the SEFI pest management scenario. Finally, I described the 
specific quantitative methods I used to parameterize the BN (Figure 3), focusing on the R-based model 
(MGDrivE) that I modified and used to simulate GDM M. musculus population dynamics and population 
genetics on SEFI. 
2.1 Framing the Farallones Case Study with the BN-RRM 
It is important to orient the formulation of a BN-RRM around specific management or regulatory goals 
for which the probability of impacts to these endpoints can be calculated. A BN-RRM framework is a 
region-specific probabilistic model that takes a systems-oriented and causal approach to incorporating 
variables relevant to calculating risk. To organize the SEFI case study within this context, I first outline 
the specific endpoints to be included in the BN-RRM. Then, I outline the specific management strategies 
that were incorporated into the model. These twelve simulated release strategies are summarized in 
Table 1. They include three GDM mouse release schemes simulated across two levels of gene drive 
resistance generation and two levels of supplemental pesticide. The ability to compare many 
management strategies in the context of multiple stressors and multiple endpoints is a distinct 




Figure 3. Bayesian network for the SEFI mouse eradication scenario. The highlighted nodes (surrounded by a red border) were 
parameterized using MGDrivE simulations. The sensitivity analyses described in section 3.3 and Figure 5 were performed using only 
the bordered nodes. Non-bordered nodes follow a uniform distribution between node states, as their CPTs have not been defined 
using numerical modeling techniques. Red nodes (A) represent toxicological variables; yellow nodes (C) represent population 
variables; purple nodes (B) represent gene drive variables; and green nodes (D) represent endpoints. The model as depicted here is 
showing the results of scenario 1 simulations after 10 years, as defined in table 1. The full model is available on WWU CEDAR.
 
 
2.1.1 Management Goals 
Integrated pest management (IPM) is a strategy employed in pest eradications that focuses on 
minimizing the use of chemical pesticides to prevent effects to non-target species.  The purpose of IPM 
is to alter the risk of non-target impacts by decreasing the amount of pesticide used, or by employing 
other methods to reduce the probability of non-target species toxicity from pesticides. In the context of 
the SEFI mouse eradication, the EIS (USFWS 2019a) suggested a number of IPM strategies to reduce 
non-target impacts of brodifacoum deployment. These strategies included gull hazing, using various 
visual and aural methods to keep western gulls away from SEFI, hypothetically reducing their exposure 
to brodifacoum; timing brodifacoum deployment to correspond with the annual low point in the M. 
musculus population that occurs in late fall or early winter; and timing the pesticide deployment to co-
occur with the low point in annual ashy storm petrel mating cycle (USFWS 2019a). In the context of this 
work, gene drive deployment corresponds with IPM, potentially reducing or eliminating the need for 
pesticides.  
Table 1. List of gene drive scenarios simulated using the modified version of the R-based model 
MGDrivE. Each of the following scenarios was simulated for 250 Monte Carlo repetitions used 
to calculate the mouse abundance and eradication probabilities input into the BN depicted in 
figure 2.  





1 GD1 No 95 
2 GD1 No 99.9 
3 GD1 Yes 95 
4 GD1 Yes 99.9 
5 GD2 No 95 
6 GD2 No 99.9 
7 GD2 Yes 95 
8 GD2 Yes 99.9 
9 GD3 No 95 
10 GD3 No 99.9 
11 GD3 Yes 95 




2.2 Analysis Tools 
To calculate the influence of GDM M. musculus and rodenticide on the risk of SEFI mouse eradication, 
three numerical models were used. First, I applied exposure-response analysis using the “drc” package 
in R (Ritz and Streibig 2020) to model the probability of M. musculus mortality given a specified dosage 
of brodifacoum. Next, I constructed a BN in accordance with the BN-RRM to causally relate variables in 
the SEFI mouse eradication scenario through conditional probability. Finally, I modified and used the R-
based model “MGDrivE” (Sánchez et al. 2020b) to simulate GDM mouse population dynamics and 
population genetics given various release strategies. 
2.2.1 Pesticide Exposure-Response Analysis using R-`drc` 
I used the “drc” package in R (Ritz and Streibig 2020) to generate a dose-response equation relating 
dosage of brodifacoum with M. musculus mortality (Figure 4; Eq. 1). A two-parameter log-logistic 
regression model was used to generate the dose-response curve and equation. 95% prediction intervals 
and 95% confidence intervals were calculated to show the degree of confidence in point estimates (LDx 
values) on the curve. Prediction intervals were assumed to represent where outcomes (data points) will 
occur with a specified degree of confidence and a specific number of future predictions, while 
confidence intervals were assumed to represent where the fitted model (regression curve) will fall with 










Figure 4. Two-parameter log-logistic dose-mortality curve for 7-day brodifacoum toxicity to M. 
musculus with plotted 95% confidence and prediction intervals. Data from Wheeler et al. (2019). 
 
2.2.2 Bayesian Network – Relative Risk Model 
Using the conceptual model of the SEFI mouse eradication scenario, I created a BN framework 
incorporating the nodes to be used for the evaluation of risk to a variety of pest management and 
conservation-based endpoints (Figure 3). While the model includes nodes for mice and other non-target 
species, the work focused only on the mouse eradication endpoint in terms of the application of 
numerical models and analysis, leaving other endpoints present, yet unparameterized.  
2.2.2.1 Endpoints 
Endpoints should be framed as specific questions with quantifiable measures of success, including 
explicit experimental units and methods for data acquisition. In the BN-RRM, endpoints must consist of 
an entity and an attribute. An entity is a specific ecological feature such as a species, group of species, or 
ecological service. An attribute is a measurable property of an entity such as population abundance or 




within the BN for the SEFI case study. The first endpoint was the probability of mouse eradication, 
where eradication is defined as having zero mice remaining on SEFI. The other endpoints included the 
probability of impacts to ashy storm petrel and western gull abundance on SEFI. I did not parameterize 
these endpoints as part of this work, but the unparameterized nodes were still included in the BN to 
show causality. Unparameterized nodes are nodes that have not been informed by empirical 
information or numerical models. For the most part, unparameterized nodes are assumed to follow a 
uniform distribution until specific analyses have been performed to generate a more informative 
parameterization. An advantage of this approach is that knowledge gaps are clearly depicted by 
unparameterized nodes. Experts with relevant knowledge can then assist in developing or applying 
techniques to parameterize these nodes. This work focused on parameterizing the mouse eradication 
endpoint using gene drive simulations. 
2.2.2.2 Bayesian Network Model Structure 
In the BN for the SEFI scenario (Figure 3), I included nodes based on the conceptual model in Figure 1, 
with groupings for rodenticide variables (group A), gene drive variables (group B), population variables 
(group C), and endpoints (group D). I also included temporal variables to show how mouse eradication 
risk changes through time. Gene drive variables included the specific release scheme of GDM mice, with 
options for three unique release patterns for GDM mice (hereafter termed GD1, GD2, GD3 - see section 
2.2.3 for descriptions). I used Netica™ (Norsys Software Corp.) for all Bayesian network construction and 
analysis. 
Rodenticide nodes included the assumed average dosage of brodifacoum to adult mice on SEFI. I 
included rodenticide-induced mortality as part of MGDrivE simulations (see section 2.2.3). Other 
rodenticide variables that I did not parameterize as part of this work included brodifacoum toxicity to 
western gulls and burrowing owls, in addition to a node for “Brodifacoum Exposure” to represent the 




brodifacoum is highly lipophilic and has a long biological half-life (Godfrey 1985) it is possible for toxicity 
to occur as a result of predation upon organisms that have ingested brodifacoum baits. Such instances 
have been documented (Eason and Spurr 1995a; 1995b; Godfrey 1985). There is no toxicity node for 
ashy storm petrels because they are considered nocturnal marine feeders and therefore have no 
apparent route of exposure to deployed rodenticide (USFWS 2019a). 
Population nodes included abundance variables for house mice, burrowing owls, ashy storm petrels, and 
western gulls. Mouse abundance is depicted as a parent node to owl abundance, as mice are thought to 
be the primary attractive force for burrowing owl migration to the South Farallones. Owl abundance is 
shown as a parent node to petrel abundance, as owls are thought to be one of the main predators of 
ashy storm petrels after the house mouse population reaches its annual low point in late fall. Population 
node states were divided into categories for “Zero,” “Low,” “Medium,” and “High” abundance 
representing ranges of organism counts for each species, with an additional node state, “Sparse,” for 
mice representing when the population was nearing eradication, but not quite at “Zero.” 
Temporal nodes included a variable for “Time” with node states for years 1-10 following a GDM mouse 
deployment. I included another temporal node called “Month” which is a parent to the owl abundance 
node and is currently unparameterized. However, this node could be used to represent migratory 
patterns for owls roosting on the South Farallones. 
2.2.3 Gene Drive Simulation 
Sánchez et al. (2020a) proposed the R-based model “MGDrivE” (Sánchez et al. 2020b) to simulate 
population dynamics of GDM mosquitoes. MGDrivE incorporates population genetics, age-class 
population dynamics, and functionalities of a variety of gene drives. Additionally, MGDrivE provides 
options for altering biological parameters of mosquitoes to accommodate a range of species, as well as, 




between patches. MGDrivE can be run as a deterministic or stochastic model, with the ability to specify 
a number of Monte Carlo simulations to be performed for stochastic runs (Sánchez et al. 2020a). 
Because I simulated mice and not mosquitoes for this risk assessment, I made a number of modifications 
to MGDrivE to accommodate mouse population dynamics and the Sox9 gene drive. Specific 
modifications are described in section 2.2.3.1. 
For each of the two gene drive release scenarios I simulated for this risk assessment framework, I 
assumed that the SEFI mouse population had a carrying capacity of 50,000 mice, based on spatial house 
mouse density estimates from the SEFI EIS (USFWS 2019a). I also assumed that the SEFI mouse 
population was divided into two patches containing 70% and 30% of the total population, with a 20% 
migration rate between patches. Patches were based on a topographic elevation map of SEFI from the 
EIS appendices (USFWS 2019b).  
I assumed that the Sox9 gene drive had a cutting rate of 99.9%, a correct homing rate of either 95% or 
99.9%, and an in-frame resistance allele generation rate of 33.3%. The cutting rate represented the rate 
of CRISPR-Cas9 successfully causing strand breakage for the target wild-type (W) allele. If cutting was 
unsuccessful, it was assumed that the organism would continue to generate W alleles. The correct 
homing rates represented the probability of successful homology-directed repair by the CRISPR-Cas9 
system, substituting gene drive (H) alleles in place of the cut W alleles. If cutting was successful and 
homing was unsuccessful, out-of-frame resistant (B) alleles were generated via non-homologous end 
joining, leading to zero fertility in homozygous (BB) offspring and a 90% fertility reduction in mice 
heterozygous for B alleles. The in-frame resistance generation rate represented the proportion of 
incorrect homing that would lead to development of in-frame resistant (R) alleles. R alleles were 
assumed to cause no reduction in fertility. I chose to compare homing rates of 95% and 99.9% percent 




(Hammond et al. 2016), and 99.9% is a hypothesized homing rate for multiplexed gene drive constructs 
(Marshall et al. 2017). 
The three release schemes for GDM mouse introduction, GD1, GD2, and GD3 were parameterized as 
described by Table 2. All release schemes were run across two levels of resistance allele generation, with 
and without toxicity, for a total of twelve runs of MGDrivE with n=250 Monte Carlo simulations for each 
run. Table 1 contains a comprehensive list of all simulations and their parameterizations. 





Number of Mice 







GD1 40 1200 60 Both 96,000 
GD2 35 2500 60 Larger* 87,500 
GD3 50 750 30 Both 75,000 
* The ecological patch containing 70% of the mouse population was considered the “Larger” patch. 
2.2.3.1 Modifications to MGDrive 
To alter the functionality of MGDrivE for compatibility with modeling population dynamics of M. 
musculus, I made changes to functions affecting mating behavior, density dependent mortality, and 
recruitment of early life stage mice.  I also added functions for modeling the dynamics of the Sox9 
CRISPR-Cas9 gene drive, including rodenticide-induced mortality in simulations, and extracting the 
numerical output of simulations into a form that could be used to parameterize the BN. I modified the 
source code of MGDrivE version 1.5.0 found at https://github.com/MarshallLab/MGDrivE. This altered 
version of MGDrivE can be found at https://github.com/eabrown2378/MGDrivE. 
In the original version of MGDrivE by Sánchez et al. (2020b) (hereafter termed “MosquitoGD”), all 
female mosquitoes are assumed to find a mate and oviposit eggs once each day, assuming panmixia 




(hereafter termed “MouseGD”), not all female mice mate and conceive offspring every day. Instead, 
each female has a probability of mating and conceiving new offspring calculated with Eq. 2: 
𝑃(𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) =
𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠
365 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠
       (Eq. 2) 
Where the annual number of litters is an assumed average for female M. musculus. I assumed an 
average of 7.5 litters in the runs of MouseGD. Because this value was used to calculate a probability, it 
was not necessary to use an integer for the average number of litters. When running MouseGD as a 
stochastic model, the probability calculated from Eq. 2 is used in a binomial distribution: 
𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 = 𝐵𝑖𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑎𝑙(𝐴𝑑𝑓 , 𝑃(𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛))  (Eq. 3) 
Where Adf is the total female population. MouseGD still assumes panmixia, unless otherwise specified, 
assigning each mating female to a mate amongst the adult male population.  
A Poisson distribution was used to calculate the number of newly gestating offspring resulting from 
conception, following Eq. 4 
𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑙𝑦 𝐺𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑀𝑖𝑐𝑒 = 𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑛(𝜆 = 𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑢𝑝𝑠 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟)   (Eq. 4) 
I assumed an average of 6 mouse pups per litter based on parameters used by Prowse et al. (2017), 
using this value as the rate parameter in draws from the Poisson distributions, with one random draw 
for each mating female.  
In MosquitoGD age-class population dynamics, four mosquito life stages were assumed: egg, pupa, 
larvae, and adult, where density-independent mortality occurred at all four life stages and density-
dependent mortality occurred at the larval stage (Sánchez et al. 2020a). In MouseGD, I also assumed 
four life stages: gestating, nursing, adolescent, and adult, maintaining density-independent mortality 












           (Eq. 5) 
Where D is the probability of surviving the density-dependent process; k is the carrying capacity for the 
adult mice and was set to 50,000 to represent the SEFI population; Ad represents the current adult 
mouse population; and Θ represents a shape parameter used to limit the mouse population to carrying 
capacity (k). A Θ value of 22.4 was used in conjunction with the assumed life cycle parameters for M. 
musculus used in these simulations. I assumed life stage times of 19 days for gestation, 23 days for 
nursing, 37 days for adolescence, and 690 days for adulthood. I based M. musculus life cycle parameters 
on estimates from Brust et al. (2015). At the time of writing this paper, no adolescent mortality is 
included in MouseGD. However, abundances of each adolescent life stage are calculated as part of daily 
mouse population dynamics and mortality processes could be added to the model with relative ease.  
In MosquitoGD, properties of gene drives are stored as 3-dimensional arrays called “Inheritance Cubes” 
which contain the expected offspring frequencies for each genotype for every male-female mating pair, 
as well as, optional parameters that can specify mechanisms such as the viability of specific mating pairs, 
genotype-specific fitness reduction, and genotype-specific sex emergence. In MouseGD, I added a novel 
inheritance cube function for the Sox9 CRISPR-Cas9 gene drive. Because the Sox9 CRISPR-Cas9 gene 
drive is supposed to function through sex-specific organism fitness, this inheritance cube function 
separated genotypes into sex-specific genotypes for modeling purposes, altering genotype-specific sex-
ratio emergence for male and female genotypes respectively. Four alleles (W/H/B/R) were included in 
the inheritance cube. See sections 1.2.1 and 2.2.3 for contextual descriptions of these alleles. W alleles 
were assumed to cause no reduction in mating fitness, with homozygotes producing a normal amount of 




reduction for males; however, they were assumed to cause 100% fitness reduction in both homozygous 
and heterozygous females. Mice homozygous for B alleles had zero mating fitness, however mice 
heterozygous for B alleles experienced a fractional reduction of 90%. Similar to W alleles, R alleles 
caused no reduction in mating fitness, however, R alleles were not subject to the enhanced inheritance 
rate of the Sox9 homing element. 
Rodenticide-induced mortality was included within the daily population dynamics of MouseGD 
simulations, applying a daily probability of mortality to each adult mouse using random draws from a 
binomial distribution following the form: 
𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐴𝑑𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑠 = 𝐵𝑖𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑎𝑙(𝐴𝑑, 1 − 𝑃(𝑙𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦))     (Eq. 6) 
For simulations that included rodenticide-induced mortality, there was a ~2.9% probability of adult 
mouse lethality for a period of 70 days coinciding with the start of GDM mouse deployment. This 
probability corresponds to an assumed 1.16 mg/kg average dose of brodifacoum to all adult mice over 
the 70-day toxicity period. This dosage was calculated from the 2-parameter log-logistic regression 
model depicted in Eq. 1 and was assumed to correspond to a 7-day LD20 for M. musculus mortality from 
brodifacoum. The daily lethality was assumed to be the 7-day lethality calculated from Eq. 1 divided by 
7. This dose-response curve (Figure 4) was generated using toxicity data from Wheeler et al. (2019). 
Changes to the source code of MGDrivE version 1.5.0 (Sánchez et al. 2020b) was conducted using RTools 
version 3.5.0.4 (Ripley et al. 2020), RStudio version 1.2.5024 (RStudio Team 2020), and R version 3.6.3 (R 
Core Team 2020).  
3. RESULTS 
For each of the twelve MouseGD runs used to parameterize the BN (Table 1), I used the 250 Monte 




abundance categories in the  mouse abundance node. I defined “High” mouse abundance as greater 
than 25,000 mice on SEFI; “Medium” mouse abundance as 10,000-25,000 mice; “Low” as 1,000-10,000 
mice; “Sparse” as 1-1,000 mice; and “Zero” as zero mice. The probability of the “Yes” state on the 
“Mouse Eradication” node was equal to the probability of “Zero” in the “Mouse Abundance” node, while 
the probability of the “No” state was equal to all non-zero states of the “Mouse Abundance” node 
combined. 
Looking at distributions of mouse abundance and the risk of mouse eradication generated by each 
simulated scenario, I made some general comparisons between the outcomes of each gene drive 
scenario. Then I looked at specific instances of risk to the mouse eradication endpoint, noting the 
influence of time, resistance generation, and pesticide usage. Finally, I used Netica’s built-in sensitivity 
analysis function to calculate the relative entropy reduction of pesticide deployment and gene drive 
resistance rate on risk to the mouse eradication endpoint. Entropy is a measure of statistical 
uncertainty, so a higher entropy reduction for a variable means that the variable has a higher influence 
on changes in the node being evaluated (Hosack et al. 2008; Marcot 2012). I conducted sensitivity 
analyses separately for GD1, GD2, and GD3 at each time point included in the BN. 
3.1 Gene Drive Release Scheme Comparisons 
GD1 simulations predicted a 94.8% probability of successful mouse eradication within 10 years of GDM 
mouse deployment when assuming no rodenticide and a 95% correct homing rate of the gene drive, 
surpassing GD2 and GD3 simulations which showed 10-year eradication probabilities of 49.6% and 0% 
respectively. GD1 overall had the highest probability of successful mouse eradication, however, 
eradication tended to occur later than GD2 or GD3. GD1 would involve the highest number of GDM mice 




GD2 simulations showed earlier eradication of mice than GD1, with 7-year eradication probabilities 
ranging from 23.6-100% depending on gene drive resistance rate and the presence or absence of 
rodenticide. 10-year eradication probabilities ranged from 49.6-100%. GD2 would require less GDM 
mice that GD1, but more GDM mice than GD3, with 87,500 mice being released over 5.75 years. 
GD3 simulations predicted the earliest possible mouse eradications out of the three release schemes, 
however, the overall probability of achieving eradication was lowest out of all the scenarios. Unless I 
assumed a 99.9% homing rate for the gene drive, there was a 0% probability of eradication with GD3. 
Although, 99.9% homing and the addition of rodenticide yielded a 40.8% probability of a “Sparse” 
mouse population after 5 years which was the earliest of any simulated scenarios to reach a “Sparse” 
mouse abundance. GD3 would involve the lowest number of released GDM mice, with a total of 75,000 
GDM mice being released over a 4-year period. 
The BN model is available is a supplementary resource file in the WWU CEDAR repository or upon 
request. The model can be viewed using the free version of Netica available at 
http://www.norsys.com/netica.html.  
3.2 Risk to Mouse Eradication Endpoint 
In addition to looking specifically at the properties of GD1-3, I also looked at the general trends of 
mouse eradication risk in terms of time, resistance development, and toxicity, as they appeared across 
all three release schemes.  
For the “Time” variable, I looked at the earliest times that each mouse population threshold was 
reached for “Medium,” “Low,” and “Sparse,” abundance as well as, the earliest time eradication was 
predicted across all simulations. 52.8% of simulations reached the “Medium” population threshold 
across all simulated scenarios after 3 years. After 4 years, the first simulations reached the “Low” 




proportion of 3.4%. One simulation reached eradication at year 6: This was a simulation for GD3 with 
rodenticide and a 99.9% correct homing rate. Knowing the probabilities of these population thresholds 
in addition to the expected times to reach these reduced abundances is a useful management tool in 
conjunction with knowing the overall probability of eradication, especially when considering that a 
drastically reduced mouse population could minimize the presence of burrowing owls, even if total 
mouse eradication has not yet been achieved. Therefore, these probabilistic results for mouse 
abundance thresholds could be useful in anticipating risk of impacts to ashy storm petrels. 
The assumed correct homing rate increased the probability of achieving eradication within 10 years for 
all tested scenarios, with 82.4% of simulations across all scenarios reaching eradication if a 99.9% 
homing rate was assumed, and only 54.9% of simulations reaching eradication with an assumed homing 
rate of 95% assumed. For GD1 and GD2, 100% of simulations showed eradication within 10 years if 
99.9% homing was assumed. For GD3, no simulations reached eradication with 95% homing, but 47.2% 
reached eradication within 10 years for a 99.9% homing rate. These results suggest that empirical 
testing of an engineered gene drive’s resistance generation is essential to evaluating the viability of 
management decisions. 
Addition of rodenticide to simulations caused an increase in eradication probability across 10/12 release 
scenarios. The exceptions were the two GD3 simulations at 95% homing rate where eradication was not 
achieved in any simulations. Averaged across all tested scenarios, 64.5% of simulations reached 
eradication within 10 years when no rodenticide was present and 72.8% of simulations reached 
eradication when rodenticide was included. Currently the BN nodes for toxicity to burrowing owls and 
laughing gulls are unparameterized, however, I expect that an increase in the amount of deployed 




3.3 Uncertainty and Sensitivity Analysis 
Sensitivity analysis can show the relative influence of parent nodes on a child node in a BN via the 
calculation of entropy reduction. In the sensitivity analyses I primarily focused on the relative entropy 
reductions of the “Correct Homing Rate” and “Pesticide Dose” nodes of the BN, holding “Time” and “GD 
Release Scheme” constant. Because unparameterized nodes interfere with sensitivity analysis 
calculations, I removed all unparameterized nodes from the BN before calculating entropy reduction.  
Overall, correct homing rate of the gene drive had a higher entropy reduction than the addition of 
rodenticide meaning that in the simulation I ran, the resistance generation rate had more influence on 
the risk of mouse eradication than the influence of toxicity. However, the relative entropy reduction 
between homing rate and rodenticide changed depending on the GD release scheme and the time since 
GDM mouse deployment. 
First, I ran sensitivity analyses on GD1-3 at year 7 (Figure 5), since this is when simulations started to 
show mouse eradication. For GD1, “Pesticide Dose” and “Correct Homing Rate” had entropy reductions 
of 0.16% and 2.36% respectively suggesting that neither of these variables had much influence of GD1’s 
eradication probability. For GD2, pesticide and homing rate had entropy reductions of 7.2% and 38.3% 
respectively meaning these variables explain a high proportion of the variance in eradication probability 
for GD2, with homing rate exerting the most influence. For GD3, pesticide and homing rate had entropy 
reductions of 8.47% and 16.7% respectively, meaning that these variables had high influence on 
eradication probability. However, as opposed to GD2, the influence of rodenticide in GD3 was more 





Figure 5. Results of sensitivity analyses for GD1-3 at years 7 and 10. Percent entropy reduction 
represents the influence of each variable on the risk of mouse eradication. I compared the 
influence of supplementary rodenticide and gene drive homing rate. Homing rate had higher 
entropy reduction across all scenarios. I performed sensitivity analyses using only 
parameterized nodes (see figure 3). I used Netica for all calculations. 
 
I also ran sensitivity analysis on GD1-3 at year 10 (Figure 5) to show which variables had the highest 
overall influence on the probability of a successful SEFI mouse eradication. For GD1, pesticide and 
homing rate had entropy reductions of 2.96% and 13.1% respectively; for GD2, entropy reductions were 
7.55% and 28.7% respectively; and GD3 entropy reductions were 0.29% and 36.7% respectively.  
In conclusion, sensitivity analysis revealed that the correct homing rate of a deployed gene drive has 
high influence on how early a planned eradication is likely to be achieved, and also on the overall 





This BN-RRM risk assessment framework for gene drives demonstrates that outcomes and uncertainties 
pertaining to environmental applications of gene drives can be probabilistically evaluated with clearly-
documented modeling assumptions. I will now discuss this the connection with NASEM criteria for risk 
assessment of gene drives, how this model fits into the broader context of synthetic biology and 
ecological risk assessment, conclusions, and next steps.  
4.1 Alignment with NASEM Criteria 
Chapter 6 of Gene Drives on the Horizon (NASEM 2016) outlines some key properties that should be 
present in an ecological risk assessment of gene drive technology: 
1. The risk assessment should be able to provide probabilistic estimates for potential harm and 
benefits of gene drive deployment using numerical models. 
BNs can combine quantitative modeling techniques and empirical information into calculations of 
probability distributions representing risk. The model demonstrates this property by generating 
distributions of mouse abundance and mouse eradication from gene drive simulations. BNs can 
compare relative impacts to multiple endpoints due to the influence of multiple stressors. 
2. The model should allow for comparison between multiple management strategies. 
The model contains the risk distributions from 12 simulated gene drive management scenarios, showing 
their efficacy across a 10-year period. The outcomes of these scenarios were calculated to inform 
specific management goals by calculating risk to endpoints. 





The endpoint nodes in this BN reflect specific management concerns around the invasive mouse 
problem on SEFI, showing the probability of accomplishing these management goals given the 
implementation of various mouse eradication strategies. Landis et al. (2017) emphasized the ability of 
the BN-RRM to evaluate a wide range of endpoints. These endpoints can be viewed in terms of their 
costs and benefits to various stakeholder groups. 
4. The model should have utility in identifying sources of uncertainty and forming an adaptive 
management scheme around gene drives. 
Sensitivity analysis was used to determine the relative influence of variables on the probability of mouse 
eradication on SEFI. These analyses could be used to prioritize research investigating the efficacy of 
various gene drive constructs. Landis et al. (2017) incorporates risk assessment and uncertainty analysis 
into an explicit adaptive management framework. Feedback from management decisions and research 
can be used to update the BN-RRM with new knowledge, informing future management decisions and 
research directions. 
In short, this model meets the recommended criteria for ecological risk assessment of gene drives 
outlined by Gene Drives on the Horizon chapter 6 (NASEM 2016) and is an appropriate framework to 
start utilizing for directing empirical gene drive research and developing site-specific adaptive 
management schemes for potential environmental applications of gene drives. 
4.2 Risk Assessment for Synthetic Biology 
The properties of this risk assessment framework for gene drives are broadly applicable to any 
ecological use of synthetic biology. The usefulness of probabilistic estimates of environmental outcomes 
is wide-ranging. Additionally, the flexible and causal nature of the BN-RRM is suitable to a plethora of 
potential scenarios related to emerging biotechnology. Utilizing the MGDrivE framework to 




dynamics, and specific gene drive parameters when simulating a SEFI mouse eradication. Adapting 
MGDrivE to risk assessment indicated the flexibility of the BN-RRM to incorporate a wide range of 
advanced numerical modeling techniques into a causal BN framework.  
4.3 Conclusions 
I demonstrated an approach to parameterizing a risk assessment model for the environmental 
deployment of GDM organisms, providing a framework that can compare multiple management 
strategies and isolate sources of scientific uncertainty. The purpose of this framework is to assist in 
prioritizing research needs and developing adaptive management strategies, enabling responsible 
investigations into the usefulness of gene drive technology and synthetic biology as a whole. 
In simulating the deployment of GDM mice on SEFI, I found that the risk of successful mouse eradication 
was greatly influenced by the resistance allele generation rate of the simulated Sox9 gene drive. These 
results suggest that thorough laboratory investigations into the homing properties of gene drives would 
be useful for predicting the likelihood of successful population suppression using a CRISPR homing 
system. 
4.4 Next Steps 
The risk assessment model presented in this study serves as a template for developing decision making 
models and orienting future research around synthetic biology and gene drives. However, before risk 
assessment frameworks can be used to direct management decisions in the field, they must be tested 
and validated using supplemental experimentation and monitoring. As I demonstrated with sensitivity 
analysis of the BN, studies to evaluate the performance of gene drives in terms of successful cutting and 
homing of the CRISPR-Cas9 system would be useful in calculating the probabilities of various outcomes 




Another set of variables that were not fully evaluated in the BN were the conservation-based endpoints, 
or the impacts to non-target species on SEFI due to the deployment of a pesticide or gene drive. For 
example, processes such as hybridization or horizontal gene transfer could potentially lead to the 
transfer of gene drives to non-target species (NASEM 2016). Pesticides can also cause non-target toxicity 
via multiple routes of exposure, including predation of dosed organisms and non-target consumption of 
bait. Many other potentially confounding variables were excluded from the analyses including seasonal 
and predatory influence on mouse population dynamics; residual toxicity, fate, and transport of 
brodifacoum rodenticide; early life stage mortality processes for mice; and potential differences in 
rodenticide sensitivity for various mouse life stages and for newly released GDM mice. 
Chapter 5 of Gene drives on the Horizon outlines a phased testing approach for gene drives (Figure 6). 
This process involves research and deployment phases encapsulating preliminary lab and field testing, 
field deployment of GDM organisms, and continuous monitoring of post-deployment impacts. This 
approach is intended to be iterative and cautious, with criteria for revisiting research or deployment 
phases when new information or uncertainties arise. Risk assessment is intended to inform this phased 
testing approach at all stages, revealing research needs and guiding adaptive management of gene 
drives. The BN-RRM is a well-suited framework for informing the NASEM-outlined goal of responsible 







Figure 6. A “phased testing” approach to gene drive research and deployment as outlined by 
Gene Drives on the Horizon, including steps for laboratory testing, field testing, GDM organism 
release, and post-release monitoring. This is intended to be an iterative process, with criteria for 
returning to previous stages if novel uncertainties arise. Modified from NASEM (2016). 
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• Netica file containing the SEFI Bayesian network model described in this work 
• Source code for the modified version of the R package MGDrivE (MouseGD) 
• R code for each of the 12 simulations run and input into the BN 
• *.csv file output for each of the 12 MouseGD simulations run and used in BN 
• R code used to generate the dose-response model in figure 3 and eq. 1 for M. musculus 
brodifacoum-induced mortality 
*these files are available in the WWU CEDAR repository (will have to get the URL later) 
